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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus curiae Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") is an
international labor union with approximately 2.2 million members. SEIU is the
nation's largest health care union, with more than 1.2 million members in the field,
including nurses, doctors, lab technicians, nursing home workers, and home care
workers. SEIU supports the Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act of
2010 ("PPACA") because it helps ensure accessible, quality health care for all
Americans, including for many members of the SEIU and their families.
Amicus curiae Change to Win is a labor federation of four national and
international labor unions - the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, United
Farm Workers of America, United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, and SEIU - which collectively represent 5.5 million working men and
women throughout the United States. Among the objects and purposes set forth in
the Change to Win Constitution are to achieve "affordable health care" for "all
workers and their families." Consistent with these objects, Change to Win, its
affiliates, and their members are vitally interested in this case.
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and no person other than amici and their
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. See
F.R.A.P.29(c)(5).
1
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INTRODUCTION
The minimum coverage provision of the PPACA, 26 U.S.C. §5000A,
imposes a tax on the income of individuals who have received income exceeding
the statutory income tax filing thresholds but who choose not to purchase essential
health insurance coverage. The tax is a percentage of income across a broad range
of incomes, represents at most a small portion of any individual's annual
household income, and is administered entirely through the income tax reporting
and collection system. The tax generates revenue that the federal government can
use to address the significant cost of paying and providing health care for taxpayers
who choose not to purchase minimum coverage. At the same time, the tax
provides an incentive to purchase affordable essential coverage, thereby reducing
the future costs to the government attributable to the health care needs of those
taxpayers.
As a tax on income, the minimum coverage provision falls squarely within
Congress' "complete and all-embracing tax power." Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1916). There is ample precedent for such a use of
Congress' taxing powers. In Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 581 (1937) ("Steward"), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937),
the Supreme Court held that the similarly structured Social Security Act - also a
cause of significant political controversy - fell well within Congress' power to tax
2
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and represented a rational congressional response to the national problems caused
by the widespread lack of unemployment and old age insurance. The PPACA' s
minimum coverage provision is no different.
Under well-established precedent, it is constitutionally irrelevant that
Congress did not name the assessment a "tax" or otherwise failed to invoke its
taxing authority expressly in the text of the PPACA. Courts have repeatedly ruled
that whether an enactment is valid as an exercise of Congress' tax authority rests
on its effect, and not on what it is called. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argues
that, for want of the word "tax," not only must the assessment itself be struck
down, but one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the last 50 years must
be overturned in its entirety.
This kind of "magic words" jurisprudence - profoundly disrespectful of the
prerogatives of the legislative branch and trivializing of fundamental constitutional
powers and their important limits - is not the law. At the heart of judicial review is
the presumption that legislatures act in a constitutional manner. New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144,169-70 (1992). A corollary is that "the
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the
power which it undertakes to exercise." Woods v. Cloyd W Miller Col, 333 U.S.
138, 144 (1948).
3
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That principle applies fully - indeed paradigmatic ally - to Congress' broad
taxing power under the Constitution. Because the minimum coverage provision
operates as a tax on income and has no punitive features to suggest it operates as
anything other than such a tax, it is within Congress' constitutional powers of
taxation - no matter what other powers Congress believed would also validate it
and what label Congress chose. See, e.g., License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1866);
In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Leckie"). The
courts are charged with policing (and protecting) the substance of Congress'
enactments, not invalidating legislation based on mere matters of form. Lynn v.
West, 134 F.3d 582,589 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998).
The PPACA has sharply divided the country along ideological lines, and
those on one side of that line strongly believe it to be bad policy. Once before in
our nation's history, courts weighed in on such policy disputes to the detriment of
their own credibility and the rule of law by engaging in precisely the kind of hyper-
formalistic jurisprudence offered by opponents of the minimum coverage
provision. But those Lochner-era judicial interventions into national policy
debates have been thoroughly discredited. Congress has ample authority under its
taxing powers to assess a tax on the income of those who decline to purchase
4
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health insurance. It is for elected legislators - not judges - to evaluate the wisdom
of such an income tax.
ARGUMENT
I. The Minimum Coverage Provision Imposes A Tax That Generates
Revenue To Offset Health Care Costs And That Encourages Taxpayers
To Purchase Minimum Essential Coverage, Which Would Further
Decrease Those Costs
A. The PPACA And Its Minimum Coverage Provision Reflect Congress'
Goals Of Reducing Health Care Costs And Enacting Fiscally
Responsible Reform
The minimum coverage provision challenged in this action, 26 U.S.C.
§5000A, is one part of a comprehensive health care reform package that was
designed to improve the nation's health and reduce the federal deficit. In enacting
the PPACA, Congress specifically noted that health care costs are imposed upon
"the federal budget," H.R. Rep . No. 111-143, pt. 1, at 1; and the federal
government uses tax revenues to pay for part of the cost of caring for the
uninsured, H.R. Rep. No. 111-143, pt. 2, at 983. The payments generated by the
minimum coverage tax will produce significant revenue to help offset these costs -
more than $4 billion in revenue each year. Congressional Budget Office,
"Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act," Apr. 30,2010, at 3.
5
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The minimum coverage provision requires "applicable individual [s]" to
ensure either that they and their applicable dependents have "minimum essential
coverage" or that they pay a tax. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(a)-(b). The provision lowers
the burden on government both by directly generating revenue and by encouraging
individuals with income to purchase health insurance for themselves and their
families, thereby lowering government health care costs. An individual subject to
the provision has the choice either to purchase minimum essential coverage or to
pay the tax - both of which promote the PPACA' s broader fiscal goals, without
requiring those who have purchased coverage to pay again.
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Assesses An Income Tax
1. The Commonwealth argues that the minimum coverage tax should be
construed as a regulatory penalty that Congress lacks the power to impose. But the
Court has an obligation to construe statutes to preserve their constitutionality. "It
is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation ... that when an Act of Congress
raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, th[e] Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (citation omitted).
Moreover, in evaluating a statute's constitutionality, the Court focuses on the
6
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substantive effect of the statute, rather than its form or label. Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,508 (1937); Lynn, 134 F.3d at 589 n.5.
The Commonwealth proceeds in precisely the opposite manner.
Specifically, it urges the Court to read 26 U.S.C. §5000A(a) and (b)(1) separately,
as first imposing a "mandate," and then a penalty for non-compliance; to treat the
label "penalty" as dispositive; and to ignore the remaining five subsections of 26
U.S.C. §5000A, which describe the income tax-based mechanism through which
Congress chose to encourage minimum essential coverage. But in New York v.
United States the Supreme Court rejected an identical argument based on the
contention that a statute contained an impermissible "direct command from
Congress." 505 U.S. at 169-70. The Court held that the "command" had to be
read in combination with other sections containing "incentives" for compliance,
and interpreted the statute as affording the States "choices" - not mandating
compliance. Id. Here, as in New York, the Court must adopt any plausible
construction that renders the minimum coverage provision constitutional. Id.
2. It is more than "fairly possible," Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, to
understand the minimum coverage provision as an income tax; indeed, that is the
best understanding of the provision. As Senator Orrin Hatch stated in objecting to
the assessment: "Some may say this is simply a penalty for not doing what Uncle
7
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Sam wants you to do, but let us face it, it is nothing more than a new tax." 155
CongoRec. S10877 (Oct. 29,2009).1
First, payment of the tax is always conditioned upon the receipt of income.
26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(2) exempts from the tax any individual whose annual
household income falls below the income tax filing thresholds at 26 U.S.C.
§6012(a)(1). Thus, the tax applies only to individuals who have received income
in excess of the filing threshold.
Additionally, the minimum coverage tax is always a small fraction of a
taxpayer's annual income, so no sources of wealth other than income are subject to
the tax. In 2016, for example, the maximum payment by a taxpayer who does not
obtain minimum coverage will be the greater of 1) 2.5% of the taxpayer's
household income above the income tax filing threshold, or 2) a flat dollar amount
1At all stages of the PPACA' s history, including after the Senate substituted the
term "penalty" for "tax" in November 2009 (compare H.R. 3962 with H.R. 3590),
proponents and opponents alike understood the provision as a "tax." E.g., 156
CongoRec. H1917 (Mar. 21,2010) (Rep. Kirk) ("Among the new taxes is a new
"Individual Mandate Tax" ... of $2,250 per household or 2 percent of household
income."); 156 Congo Rec. E506 (Mar. 21,2010) (Rep. Waxman) ("The individual
responsibility requirement requires individuals to pay a tax on their individual tax
filings .... "); see also H.R. Committee on Budget, Rep. No. 111-443, at 265 (Mar.
17, 2010) (discussing "tax on individuals who opt not to purchase health
insurance").
8
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ranging from $695 to $2085, depending on family size. 26 U.S.C. §5000A( c)(2)-
(3).2 Because the flat minimum falls far below the statutory income tax filing
thresholds that determine whether someone must make the payment, the payment
will always be a small portion of any taxpayer's income.
Further, the tax is calculated as a specified percentage of income for a broad
range of income earners. In 2016, the tax will be 2.5% of household income above
the filing threshold whenever that amount falls below the national average
premium for coverage but exceeds the flat penalty amount. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(c).
The tax on individuals will thus be defined as a percentage of household income
for individuals whose income ranges from less than $40,000 (the income at which
2.5% of household income over the filing threshold exceeds the $695 penalty) to
more than $200,000 (the income at which that amount exceeds a conservatively
estimated average premium of$5,000 for individual coverage);'
2 The maximum payment is capped at the national average premium for certain
qualified health plans. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(c)(1)(B).
3 If the average premium is higher, the upper limit will be even greater. Because
2016 filing thresholds are not available, these values are determined using the 2010
filing threshold of $9,350. Many individuals with income near the lower level will
be otherwise exempted from the tax. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1)
(affordabilityexemption).
9
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That every particular taxpayer's payment is not always calculated as a
percentage of annual household income is irrelevant. The Social Security tax is
similarly capped. See 75 Fed. Reg. 74123-01; 26 U.S.C. §3121(a)(1); 42 U.S.C.
§430. The general federal income tax also includes an "alternative minimum tax"
designed to ensure that taxpayers pay a minimum tax. See 26 U.S.C. §55. The
minimum coverage tax remains an income tax even though Congress, while
generally defining the incentive as a percentage of household income, chose to
impose a ceiling and a floor on the amount of the tax (with the ceiling always well
below income received).
A number of other features strengthen the conclusion that the minimum
coverage provision assesses an income tax. The tax is assessed entirely through
the income tax system, and compliance with the tax's insurance conditions
depends on the same self-reporting obligations as other aspects of the income tax.
Any payment in lieu of maintaining the essential coverage must be included with
the taxpayer's income tax return, 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b)(2), and such payments are
treated in the same manner as other tax penalties, id. §5000A(g)(1). Indeed, the
statute expressly states that the penalties are to be "assessed and collected in the
same manner as taxes" and they are by law included in "any reference in [the
Internal Revenue Code] to 'tax.'" Id. §6671(a). Moreover, the minimum coverage
10
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provision treats family relationships in the same manner as they are treated more
generally in the income tax code. Id. §5000A(b )(2) (individuals liable for
payments required by their dependents or spouse with whom they choose to file a
joint return); id. §5000A(c)(4) (household income and family size defined by
reference to exemptions for dependents claimed in income tax return) (citing 26
U.S.C. §151).
3. Ignoring these aspects of the assessment - which define its actual
operation - the court below relied solely on the terminology Congress used. But
neither Congress' use of the word "penalty" nor its express invocation of its
Commerce Clause powers affects the provision's constitutional status.
It makes no difference that Congress relied on its powers under the
Commerce Clause. In determining whether a statute is constitutional under a
particular congressional power, the relevant question is whether Congress had the
power to act under that provision, not whether Congress named the correct
provision. See Woods, 333 U.S. at 144 ("The constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise."); Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583 (finding insurance premium payments mandated
11
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by Coal Act to be exercise of taxing power notwithstanding Congress' invocation
of commerce power)."
Similarly, the use of the term "penalty" does not affect the status of the
provision under the Constitution. Congress need not label a monetary exaction a
"tax" to exercise its taxing power. In the License Tax Cases, the Supreme Court
held that the imposition of a "license" requirement on gambling and liquor
businesses was a constitutional exercise of Congress' taxing power and construed
the license fee as a "tax," even though license requirements were conventionally
used as a means of regulation, 72 U.S. at 470-71, and the license tax discouraged
businesses that were then widely considered to be immoral. Id. at 473. See also
Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583 (finding Congress exercised its taxing power in requiring
coal mine operators to pay health insurance "premiums").
In any event, Congress' use of the word "penalty" in the statute is entirely
consistent with Congress' intent to assess an income tax. Indeed, Congress has
instructed that the minimum coverage provision's "penalty" must be construed as a
tax for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(g)(1);
4 Proponents of the PPACA invoked Congress' taxing power during the legislative
process. See, e.g., 155 CongoRec. S13581 (Dec. 20,2009) (Sen. Baucus); 155
CongoRec. S13751-52 (Dec. 22,2009) (Sen. Leahy); 156 Congo Rec. H1882 (Mar.
21,2010) (Rep. Miller); 156 Congo Rec. H1826 (Mar. 21,2010) (Rep. Slaughter).
12
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6671(a). In the debates surrounding the PPACA, Congress used the terms "tax"
and "penalty" interchangeably.' Given Congress' failure to distinguish between
the two terms, this Court cannot read any meaningful intent into the use of the term
"penalty. "
4. To be sure, there are statutory penalties that are not "taxes" because
they have unique "anomalies" designed to punish in ways that are "far-removed"
from taxation. Dept. of Revenue of Man tana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,783
(1994). But the provision here has no such punitive traits that would justify that
characterization. 6
5 See, e.g., 155 CongoRec. S12768 (Dec. 9,2009) (Sen. Grassley) ("The ...
individual mandate penalty tax ... is a tax. It can be called a penalty, but it is a
tax."); 155 Congo Rec. S11454 (Nov.l8, 2009) (Sen. McCain) ("Taxes on
individuals who fail to maintain government-approved health insurance coverage
will pay $4 billion in new penalties .... "); 155 CongoRec. H12576 (Nov. 6,2009)
(Rep. Franks) ("It would impose a 2.5 percent penalty tax on those who do not
acquire health care insurance."); 155 Congo Rec. S11143 (Nov. 5,2009) (Sen.
Johanns) (discussing "penalty tax on individuals without insurance"); 155 Congo
Rec. S10746 (Oct. 27,2009) (Sen. Enzi) ("Most young people will probably do the
math and decide ... I can pay the $750-a year tax penalty rather than pay $5,000 a
year more for health insurance."); 155 CongoRec. S8644 (Aug. 3,2009) (Sen. Kyl)
("There would be a penalty if they refused to [buy health insurance] that would go
directly to their income tax.").
6 Many "taxes" may serve to discourage (or induce) behavior that is subject to (or
exempt from) the tax, but far more is needed before a provision having such an
effect loses its characteristics as a tax. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778
(cautioning "against invalidating a tax" because "oppressive or because the
(continued)
13
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First, the minimum coverage provision gives taxpayers the option of
purchasing insurance or paying the tax. Had Congress intended to ensure
compliance with a regulatory "mandate" through a "penalty," it could have
structured the "penalty" so that its payment would not relieve taxpayers of the
underlying obligation. Cf us. v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,
518 U.S. 213,225-226 (1996).
Second, the amount of the tax is at most the "approximate equivalent" of the
cost of insurance, not an excessively "high rate" that is "consistent with a punitive
character." Cf Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780 (punitive drug tax was eight times
drug's market value). That Congress chose a non-punitive approach is not only
reflected in the overall amount of the tax, but also in that the amount is pro-rated if
the taxpayer obtains insurance for part of the tax year. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b).
Cf Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922), entitled "The Child
Labor Tax Case" (penalty not pro-rated).
(continued)
legislature's motive was somehow suspect" for both taxes and penalties "deter
certain behavior"); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (wagering
tax not penalty "regardless of its regulatory effect"). As Justice Holmes
recognized, there is no "difference between being fined and being taxed a certain
sum for doing a certain thing" in the absence of "some further disadvantages."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,461 (1897).
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Third, the payment of the tax is not conditioned on the commission of a
crime or based on illegal conduct. Cf Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781-82
(conditioning of tax on crime "is 'significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather
than the gathering of revenue"') (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.
287,295 (1935)). Indeed, the Act provides no consequence other than the tax for
opting not to purchase insurance, and specifically bars the government from
resorting to criminal prosecution or penalties, liens, or levies in the event of failure
to pay the tax. Id. §5000A(g)(2).
Finally, the placement of the minimum coverage provision in the Internal
Revenue Code, coupled with conferral of enforcement power on the Secretary of
the Treasury, evidences an exercise of the taxing power rather than imposition of a
regulatory penalty. See Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583 n.12.
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Within Congress' Plenary Power
To Tax Income
The minimum coverage provision, which we demonstrated above is an
income tax, is well within Congress' taxing powers. The Constitution affords
Congress broad and comprehensive power to tax, independent of the other
enumerated congressional powers and subject only to narrow limitations. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936); Pacific Ins. Co. v Soule, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 433, 443-45 (1868); see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171,
15
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174 (1796) (Chase, J.) ("A general power is given to Congress, to lay and collect
taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only on exports.").
Congress' power to tax income is especially broad. See, e.g., United States v.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 98 (1936) ("When it is [income],
it may be taxed .... "). We discuss below the contours of Congress' taxation
power to show that the minimum coverage provision is situated comfortably within
that power.
A. The Constitution's Taxation Provisions
"The great object of the Constitution was, to give Congress a power to lay
taxes, adequate to the exigencies of government. ... " Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173. The
power to tax granted to Congress is plenary: "nothing is clearer, from the
discussions in the Convention and the discussions which preceded final ratification
by the necessary number of States, than the purpose to give this power to
Congress, as to the taxation of everything except exports, in its fullest extent."
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869). This "complete and all-
embracing tax power" "is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of
taxation." Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12-13.
The power is subject to only limited requirements.
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1. An exercise of Congress' taxation power must produce "some
revenue." Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 & n.l (1937) (upholding
$200 annual tax paid by 27 individuals in 1934 and 22 individuals in 1935); see
also United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 (1919) (requiring "relation to the
raising of revenue"). The minimum coverage income tax satisfies the revenue
requirement. The PPACA was prompted in part by Congress' concern about the
use of revenue for health care costs, and the minimum coverage provision will
generate $4 billion in revenue each year. See supra Part LA. This amount far
exceeds the revenue generated by other measures that the Supreme Court has
determined were valid taxes. See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 n.4 (noting valid taxes
generating as little as $3,501 or $28,911).
2. Congress must use its taxation power to promote the "general
welfare." U.S. Const., art. I, §8; see also Butler, 297 U.S. at 66. The scope of the
"general welfare" "is quite expansive." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976).
The discretion to determine whether a particular tax serves the general welfare as
opposed to more narrow concerns "belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
17
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Congress enacted the minimum coverage tax as part of a programmatic
response to the significant national problems caused by the number of Americans
without adequate health insurance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2). This readily
satisfies the general welfare requirement.
3. The Constitution imposes two limitations on the means by which
Congress taxes: "direct taxes, including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned;
[and] duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform." Soule, 74 U.S. at 446.
"Subject to such limitation [s] Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and
may exercise the power conferred at its discretion." Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93.
Congress' power to tax income is particularly expansive because, in doing
so, Congress acts not only within its general authority to enact "excises" but with
the specific authorization of the Sixteenth Amendment. See Brushaber, 240 U.S.
at 241. That amendment provides that Congress "shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S.
Const. amend. XVI. The Amendment grants Congress plenary authority to tax any
"accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion." C.I.R. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,431 (1955).
Although Congress may not use its power to tax income to pass taxes that are
18
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actually property taxes, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,219 (1920), the
Supreme Court has limited this holding, Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430-31
(Macomber "not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income
questions"), and instructed that "income," as used in both the Sixteenth
Amendment and in the internal revenue code, should be construed liberally to
further the purpose of the Amendment. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509,521 (1921); see also Safety Car, 297 U.S. at 98 ("When
it is [income], it may be taxed.").
Under the Sixteenth Amendment, "income taxes ... [are] not ... subject to
the regulation of apportionment." Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18. The tax need only
be uniform. Id. at 18-19. To satisfy this requirement, the minimum coverage tax
must merely exhibit no "undue preference" for certain states. United States v.
Ptansynski, 462 U.S. 74, 86 (1983). The tax readily satisfies this test because it
applies the same formula throughout the nation. Although the affordability
exemption depends in part upon the cost of procuring health insurance in the State
where a particular taxpayer resides, see 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii), this
distinction based on neutral factors and exhibiting no intent to discriminate among
the states certainly satisfies the uniformity requirement. Ptansynski, 462 U.S. at
19
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77-86 (tax exemption for "Alaskan oil" consistent with uniformity requirement
because it reflected "climactic and geographic conditions"). 7
4. Finally, in exercising its plenary taxation power, Congress must not
offend the Constitution's individual rights provisions. For example, Congress may
not use its taxation power in a manner that violates constitutional prohibitions on
double jeopardy or self-incrimination. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767; Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). But there is no reasonable argument that the
minimum coverage provision offends any provision of the Bill of Rights.
The minimum coverage provision easily satisfies all constitutional criteria
and is thus a valid exercise of Congress' taxing powers.
B. The Commonwealth's Argument Depends Upon Discredited
Restrictions On The Taxing Power
Although the Commonwealth's primary argument ignores the substance of
the minimum coverage provision and focuses exclusively on the label Congress
used, the Commonwealth also argues that the provision exceeds Congress' taxing
powers in its substance. But the Supreme Court long ago abandoned the
Commonwealth's approach to Congress' taxing power.
7 Because all excise taxes, including income taxes, are subject only to the
uniformity requirement, the minimum coverage provision remains constitutional if
it is construed not as an income tax but as some other form of excise tax.
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It is well-established that Congress may exercise its taxing and spending
powers over areas falling outside its other enumerated powers: "the power of
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." Butler,
297 U.S. at 66; see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.8 Put simply, the taxing power
"reaches every subject." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained taxes on intrastate activity, including in
contexts (or during periods) where such intrastate activities were well-understood
as beyond Congress' interstate commerce authority. See, e.g., Fernandez v.
Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1946) ("death tax"); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124
(1929) (gift tax); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance and legacy
tax); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331 (1874) (estate tax); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S.
at 470- 71 (tax on intrastate lottery and liquor trades).
The Commonwealth nonetheless asserts that Congress' overriding purpose
was to regulate, and not to tax, and that "the law is that Congress can tax under its
taxing power that which it can't regulate, but it can't regulate through taxation that
8 The spending power is derivative of the taxing power, South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203,206 (1987), and for that reason the scope of both powers is coterminous,
see Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
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which it cannot otherwise regulate." District Court Op. at 29 (quoting Tr. 81:18-
21, July 1, 2010). The courts, however, have rejected just such attempts to limit
Congress' taxing power.
"'From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes
although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which,
considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize
by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment. '" Us. v. Sanchez, 340
U.S. 42,45 (1950) (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40,47 (1934)).
Thus, courts have repeatedly upheld Congress' placement of conditions on the
payment of taxes or receipt of government funds to achieve "objectives not thought
to be within Article l's 'enumerated legislative fields,' [Butler, 297 U.S. at 65]."
South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 207 (collecting cases); see also Regan v. Taxation
Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress cannot prohibit lobbying
but can tax organizations that lobby while exempting those that do not); Steward,
301 U.S. 548 (Congress may impose greater tax on employers who do not
contribute to state unemployment insurance programs that meet federal standards).
Indeed, if Congress could not regulate indirectly through taxation that which
it cannot regulate directly, all taxes on matters falling outside Congress' other
enumerated powers would fail: "Every tax is in some measure regulatory."
22
Case: 11-1057     Document: 51-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 31
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). For many years, it has been
understood that revenue generation simply need not be the sole motive for
Congress' decision to exercise its taxation power. J. W Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394,412 (1928) ("other motives in the selection of the
subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional action"); see also Kahriger, 345
U.S. at 22.
Ultimately, the Commonwealth must rely on three Lochner-era cases - Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 29; Butler, 297 U.S. at 68; and Linder v. United
States, 268 U.S. 5, 17 (1925); see District Court Op. at 29. This reliance is both
revealing and misplaced.
First, the Commonwealth ignores that these cases cannot be reconciled with
the many precedents discussed above.
Second, the decisions in these cases and other similar cases of that era turned
on the thoroughly discredited view that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from
regulating directly or indirectly specific "matters of state concern" or matters
"within power reserved to the States" - even through otherwise valid exercises of
its taxation power. Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at
36; Linder, 268 U.S. at 17.
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The Court changed course when the Great Depression compelled the
conclusion that several problems previously considered exclusively to be "state
concerns" had "become national in area and dimensions," Steward, 301 U.S. at
586, and that the Court should no longer police whether particular policy problems
are inherently "national" or "local" for purposes of the Tenth Amendment. This
shift in jurisprudence means that, although the Tenth Amendment still bars
Congress from "commandee[ring] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program," New York,
505 U.S. at 161 (quotation marks and citation omitted), it does not bar Congress
from using its power to tax and spend to create financial incentives for conduct that
Congress has determined serves the general welfare, id. at 166-67, 171-73. See
also Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 362 ("The Tenth Amendment does not operate as a
limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national
government."). The lack of quality, affordable health care coverage, and the fiscal
and social consequences that flow from the growing numbers of uninsured
Americans are matters of national concern that Congress can properly address
through its plenary taxation and spending powers.
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C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Constitutionally
Indistinguishable From The Social Security Act
Indeed, there is direct precedent rejecting such a fundamental challenge to a
national insurance program enacted through Congress' taxing power. From a
constitutional perspective, the tax imposed by the minimum coverage provision is
no different from the unemployment and old age insurance system Congress
established through its taxing powers in the Social Security Act. See Helvering,
301 U.S. 619; Steward, 301 U.S. 548. The constitutional propriety of that exercise
of Congress' taxation power is beyond dispute, and there is no basis to treat this
income tax any differently.
1. The Social Security Act established comprehensive insurance
programs to address the financial insecurity stemming from economic
retrenchment and "old age." Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641. To fund the "Federal
Old-Age Benefits," the Social Security Act "la[id] two different types of tax, an
'income tax on employees,' and 'an excise tax on employers.'" Id. at 635-36. To
provide unemployment insurance benefits, Congress imposed an excise tax on
employers but permitted employers to claim a credit for contributions to a state
unemployment fund, provided that the state law satisfied certain criteria. Steward,
301 U.S. at 574.
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In Helvering and Steward, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional
challenges to these provisions. The Helvering Court rejected claims that the tax on
employers "was not an excise as excises were understood when the Constitution
was adopted" and that the Act was "an invasion of powers reserved by the Tenth
Amendment to the states or to the people." 301 U.S. at 637. Steward rejected the
argument that Congress' decision to credit against the federal tax only
contributions to state unemployment funds that complied with federal requirements
was an impermissible mandate on states to create particular programs such that the
"so-called tax was not a true one." Steward, 301 U.S. at 592. The Court
concluded that the conditional tax credit was not "coercive," but instead "promoted
... relief through local units" while "in all fairness" ensuring that "cooperating
localities" would not "pay a second time." Id. at 589.
These New Deal enactments were politically divisive, but the courts long
ago abandoned their interventions into such policy debates. Taxpayers have
continued to resist payment of the taxes by challenging their constitutionality and
complaining (much like opponents of the PPACA) that Congress cannot use its
taxing power to establish "compulsory benefits" that they do not want or will not
use, but those claims have been universally rejected. As the Supreme Court
explained in rejecting a claim that a state unemployment tax was unconstitutional
26
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because "those who pay the tax may not have contributed to the unemployment
and may not be benefited by the expenditure": "It is irrelevant to the permissible
exercise of the power to tax that some pay the tax who have not occasioned its
expenditure, or that in the course of the use of its proceeds for a public purpose the
legislature has benefited individuals, who mayor may not be related to those who
are taxed." Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 521, 525; see also Us. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982); Cain v. United States, 211 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1954); Palmer v. Comm 'r of
Internal Revenue, 52 T.C. 310 (1969).
2. It also makes no difference that, instead of mandating participation in
a single national insurance program or taxing all and then providing a credit to
some, Congress opted to promote individual choice by giving taxpayers the option
of purchasing an insurance plan that meets minimum standards or paying a tax,
which in all relevant respects is no different. The requirement generates revenue
for the government to offset program costs, including the additional costs caused
by those who decline to purchase insurance. And it does so in a manner that both
provides an incentive for taxpayers to purchase health insurance and avoids
creating an additional obligation for those who already purchased coverage.
Ultimately, payment of the minimum coverage tax is, as in Steward, "dependent
upon the conduct of the taxpayers." 301 U.S. at 591.
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The constitutionality of such a conditional tax was established in Steward,
which held that Congress may use its taxing power to stimulate activity, including
the purchase of insurance. Id.; see also Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 353 (Congress
"may tax the exercise, non-exercise, or relinquishment of a power of disposition of
property" (emphasis added)). Steward reco gnized that many states would not
independently enact unemployment compensation programs, fearing that "they
would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with
neighbors or competitors." Id. at 588. The Social Security Act addressed this
problem by generating revenues that would "be used and needed by the nation as
long as states [were] unwilling ... to do what can be done at home" while
"crediting the taxpayer ... to the extent that his contributions [to a state
program] ... have simplified or diminished the problem of relief and the probable
demand upon the resources of the fisc." Id. at 588-89.
The minimum coverage provision is, in substance and effect,
indistinguishable from the conditional tax Steward upheld. Providing healthcare to
the uninsured imposes an immense burden on the state and federal fiscs. E.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 111-143, pt. 2, at 983 ("In 2008, total government spending to reimburse
uncompensated care costs ... was approximately $42.9 billion."). Most states
have not gone beyond providing care to the indigent, children, and elderly -
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leaving many Americans with no health coverage. CMS, 2009 National Health
Expenditure Data, tables 5 & 11 (2011). Employer-provided health benefits are
declining because of the rising costs of healthcare (despite existing tax credits).
High Health Care Costs: A State Perspective: Hearing Before S. Comm. On
Finance, 110th Congo S2 (2008) (Sarah Collins, The Commonwealth Fund). And
many individuals who wish to purchase insurance cannot do so because insurance
companies refuse to cover them or the premiums are unaffordable. 155 CongoRec.
S13568-69 (Dec. 20,2009) (Sen. Baucus). Now, as in 1935, Congress has "many
reasons - fiscal and economic as well as social and moral - for planning to
mitigate disasters that bring these burdens in their train." Steward, 301 U.S. at
587.
The PPACA addresses the obstacles to comprehensive health insurance
coverage in part by barring insurance companies from practices such as denying
coverage for pre-existing conditions, and in part by providing additional tax
incentives for individuals to purchase insurance. Here, as with Social Security,
"[t]he purpose of [Congress'] intervention ... is to safeguard its own treasury and
as an incident to that protection to place the [taxpayers] upon a footing of equal
opportunity. Drains upon its own resources are to be checked; obstructions to the
freedom of the [taxpayers] are to be leveled." Id. at 590-91. By giving taxpayers
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the choice to purchase insurance or pay a tax that is at most the "approximate
equivalent," id. at 591, the minimum coverage provision, like the Social Security
Act, excuses cooperating taxpayers from having "to pay a second time." Id. at
589.
Any argument that Congress could have passed the minimum coverage
provision as a general income tax increase accompanied by a credit for those who
purchase qualifying health insurance but could not give individuals the option of
either purchasing insurance or paying a tax is meaningless formalism. Both
methods would have precisely the same effect, and neither is punitive. See United
States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510,517 (1942) (explaining, in the context of the
Social Security Act's unemployment insurance tax and credit mechanism, that
"[t]he effort by the United States to obtain the revenue by denying the credit must
be regarded as the levying of a tax and not as the exaction of a penalty"); supra at
Part LBA.
As we emphasized at the outset, difference in form alone cannot determine
the minimum coverage provision's constitutional status. The Constitution gives
Congress "the useful and necessary right ... to select ... means" "which, in its
judgment, would most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819). Here, the means
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Congress chose in exercising its taxing powers - imposing an income tax upon
those who choose not to purchase minimum essential health insurance - are less
burdensome on taxpayers and the government than a functionally identical tax and
credit system would be: Because the majority of income taxpayers already have
health coverage, it is less onerous to tax only those who decline to purchase health
insurance. Nothing in the Constitution requires Congress to refrain from using the
most efficient and convenient means to accomplish its permitted ends. See id. at
421 (Congress may use all "appropriate" and "plainly adapted" means in
exercising its constitutional powers).
In sum, in substance and effect the minimum coverage provision is a tax.
Mere matters of form cannot render unconstitutional this proper exercise of
Congress' taxation powers.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court and
hold the minimum coverage provision constitutional.
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